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February 2007 News
Somalia: Another Front in the War on Terror?
By Ron Martin, Jr.
HOOD RIVER, ORE. -- Not since the “Blackhawk Down” tragedy in 1993, when 18 US soldiers died in pursuit of a Mogadishu warlord, has Somalia received so much media coverage. For 16 years, Somalia has been a failed state with no central government, awash with weapons, wracked by clan rivalries, and ruled by warlords. But only when the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC)* took control of southern and central Somalia last summer, did the
United States administration become concerned about the threat of Somalia being taken over by Islamic extremists and becoming a potential safe haven and training ground for al-Qaeda. Ethiopia, having a long porous border with Somalia to the east, used its military might to help the Somali Transitional Federal Government
(TFG)** recapture territory from the UIC. The US then attacked what it said were terrorists who had retreated with the UIC to southern Somalia. The actions of the numerous players in Somalia could determine the course of Somalia and the region for years to come.
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| A Somali woman, with her child strapped onto her back,
waters camels at a traditional well near Walaq, a rural area about 14 miles (22 km) southwest of Wajid. Many Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists and depend on their livestock for milk and meat. The
Action contre la Faim Water and Sanitation Program in Somalia rehabilitated wells in order to increase the quality and quantity of water available to the local population in areas of need.
(Photo © 2005 Ron Martin, Jr.) |
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Somalia’s fledgling government
The TFG, Somalia’s interim government, was set up in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2004 through peace negotiations sponsored by the seven-nation east African regional body IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development). Although the TFG was internationally recognized, it was weak and divided, disagreeing on when to return and where to meet in Somalia. Finally in February 2006, they set up government in Baidoa, the small regional capital 155 miles (250 km) northwest of the national capital, Mogadishu. Parliamentary seats and cabinet positions were apportioned to provide representation amongst Somalia’s major clans but they also included many rival warlords.
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| This “technical” or “battlewagon” was part of warlord Mohammed Dheri’s militia in Jowhar, about 50 miles (80 km) north of Mogadishu. Technicals, often just Toyota pickup trucks with large caliber machine guns, are the cavalry of the militias. This technical is a large flatbed truck with an anti-aircraft gun mounted in back and a machine gun mounted in the passenger seat.
(Photo © 2005 Ron Martin, Jr.) |
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President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi, and (recently dismissed) Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan were often at odds with each other. The Parliament and Cabinet had been deeply divided, especially on whether to negotiate with the UIC, whether to request protection from foreign troops, and whether the TFG should meet in Mogadishu.
After the UIC captured Mogadishu, Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to protect the besieged TFG in Baidoa. The UIC then swept through much of Somalia, filling the political vacuum that the TFG could and would not fill.
The Islamic courts
Over the past several years, individual Islamic courts had formed in various parts of Mogadishu to provide law and order through Sharia (Islamic) law. These distinct Islamic courts united to form the Union of Islamic Courts backed by militias that enforced their rulings. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who headed the UIC Shura (consultative body), is considered a hard-line Islamist. The US has linked him and the militant wing of the UIC, the Shabaab, to terrorists. The more moderate Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, head of the UIC executive committee, has met the US ambassador to Kenya and
Somalia after fleeing from Somalia and surrendering to Kenyan authorities.***
The US has pressured the TFG to talk with Sheikh Sharif and other moderate leaders from the UIC.
Many residents of Mogadishu welcomed the UIC because it united the city and brought peace and stability. Residents no longer had to worry about kidnapping, paying militias at checkpoints, or the anarchy the warlords caused. Businessmen financed the UIC because it provided a stable climate for commerce. The UIC opened the Mogadishu airport and seaport for the first time in over a decade. Almost all Somalis are Sunni Muslims and most were willing to live under Sharia law because it brought law and order.
However, some were unhappy with the rule of the UIC, which had sometimes been heavy-handed. Some courts had shut down radio stations, prohibited people from watching movies and World Cup Soccer, and imposed harsh punishments such as flogging for drug dealing, amputation for theft, and stoning to death for rape and murder. One of the UIC’s most controversial domestic actions was banning
khat (or miraa), a mild narcotic leaf chewed for its stimulating effect. When protesting
khat sellers burned tires and threw stones, UIC security forces shot and killed one of the protesters.
Failed negotiations lead to fighting
Both the UIC and TFG had claimed to have wanted to settle their dispute peacefully but blamed each other for intransigence. The UIC had continued to expand its control over southern and central Somalia while the TFG was reluctant to ask its protectors, the Ethiopians, to leave
Somalia -- an action which would have left the TFG vulnerable to the UIC. Ethiopia originally denied having military troops in Somalia, claiming only to have military trainers and a few troops to protect the TFG. In June and September 2006, the Arab League brought the TFG and UIC together for peace talks in Khartoum, Sudan, but the two sides failed to implement their agreements. Just before the fighting started, the European Union envoy obtained a pledge from both sides to return to negotiations.
Heavy fighting broke out at the end of December 2006 after the deadline the UIC had set for Ethiopia to leave Somali territory expired. The UIC had moved their militia close to Baidoa and the Ethiopian border and had threatened jihad (holy war) inside Ethiopia. The UIC was no match for the artillery,
tanks and MiG fighter jets of the Ethiopian army. In less than two weeks, the Ethiopian army and TFG forces recaptured most of the territory the UIC had taken in the previous six months. Although the UIC leaders claimed to have made a strategic retreat, they were soundly defeated and reportedly took heavy casualties. The TFG, with the help of Ethiopian troops, has been trying to pacify the areas it has captured and exert its control over the country.
Current instability
Clan warfare, warlords, guerilla attacks by the Islamists and attacks on Ethiopian occupying troops all threaten the stability of the TFG and Somalia. Warlords looted weapons caches after the UIC fled, and the UIC reportedly turned over weapons to Mogadishu militias hostile to the TFG. Many households in Mogadishu have weapons. Most of the militias and residents ignored Prime Minister Gedi’s recent call for a mandatory disarmament in Mogadishu and hid their weapons. Many were waiting to see if the TFG could establish order while others were worried that they could be vulnerable to clans in other parts of Somalia who had not been ordered to disarm. Although the TFG has diverse clan representation, President Yusuf’s clan has fought the clan that dominates
Mogadishu.
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| Armed guard (left) and Action contre la Faim (AcF) Water and Sanitation Surveyor (center) measure water depth, as a local villager (right) looks on. Because of the insecurity in Somalia, AcF employees require armed guards for protection while working in the field. AcF rehabilitated this well, on the outskirts of Wajid, which is about 185 miles (300 km) northwest of Mogadishu.
(Photo © 2005 Ron Martin, Jr.) |
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The UIC has threatened to launch a guerilla war against the Ethiopian troops occupying Somali territory. Many UIC militiamen are reported to have taken off their uniforms and melted back into their villages. They could potentially be a future threat. If the TFG cannot maintain law and order, Somalis may yearn for the rule of the UIC. There have already been numerous attacks on TFG and Ethiopian soldiers in Mogadishu, although the identity of the attackers is unknown.
Ethiopian withdrawal
Aware of the danger to its troops and the cost, the Ethiopian government has said it will withdraw its military from Somalia within weeks. The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, which has already started, could leave the weak TFG vulnerable. Ethiopia, many regional and African
nations and the international community are all trying to get an 8,000-strong African peacekeeping force into Somalia before the Ethiopians depart and leave a security vacuum. Most countries being asked to contribute troops will require financial assistance and logistical support. The African Union, which just concluded a summit in Ethiopia, was only able to secure about half the needed troops. Uganda, Malawi, Nigeria, and reportedly Ghana have offered troops, while several other countries are considering sending troops. Many countries are worried about putting their soldiers in a potentially dangerous setting, and others already have peacekeepers deployed to other conflicts on the continent.
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| This map shows the area around the town of Wajid,
Somalia, approximately 185 miles (300 km) northwest of Mogadishu. Baidoa, approximately 55 miles (89 km) southeast of Wajid (lower right), is the capital of Bay Region
(shaded yellow) and the current seat of the Transitional Federal Government. Ethiopia is less than 50
miles (80 km) northwest of Wajid. Mandera (upper left) lies in the northeast tip of Kenya. Red lines are
dirt roads. Blue line running through Doolow and Luuq is the Jubba River.
(Map courtesy Ron Martin, Jr.) |
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Most Mogadishu residents would like to see African peacekeepers replace the Ethiopian troops. Many Somalis, especially those in Mogadishu, are suspicious of the Ethiopian government, which had supported several of the warlords that brought anarchy to Mogadishu for more than a decade. Some Somalis believe that Ethiopia is less threatened by a weak and divided TFG while others think landlocked Ethiopia desires a friendly government in Somalia that would grant access to its deepwater ports. Also, from 1977 to 1978, Somalia fought and lost a bloody war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, which is populated mostly by ethnic Somalis. Fears that the UIC would join with separatists in the Ogaden region and incorporate it into a “Greater Somalia” contributed to Ethiopia’s intervention.
Foreign intervention
Many analysts feared Ethiopia’s military intervention could lead to a greater regional conflict. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea, which fought each other in a bloody border war from 1998 to 2000, had been deeply involved in the current conflict in Somalia. While Ethiopia supported the TFG with direct military intervention, Eritrea had been supporting the UIC with weapons and advisors. Several other countries were also involved. A report by the UN Somalia Monitoring Group claims that Djibouti, Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Hezbollah in Lebanon provided arms and training to the UIC while Yemen and Uganda have supported the TFG. Kenya, at the urging of President Yusuf, closed its border with Somalia to prevent the retreating UIC from seeking refuge there and possibly using Kenyan territory to launch a guerrilla war. Kenya also captured many UIC members and supporters who slipped across the border. A spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross expressed concern when Kenya flew several of them, hands tied and legs shackled, to Mogadishu.
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| Old abandoned tanks have been stripped clean in this scrap yard on the outskirts of Wajid. The tanks, along with numerous other military vehicles and weapons, are from the war with Ethiopia that ended in 1978.
(Photo © 2005 Ron Martin, Jr.) |
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Humanitarian disaster
Kenya, which has a large ethnic Somali population and hosts 160,000 registered Somali refugees, and possibly as many unregistered ones, is worried about an influx of refugees and weapons. While many have been displaced within or from Somalia because of 16 years of civil strife, others have left because of natural disasters and economic hardship. After suffering its worst drought in more than a decade, southern Somalia was hit by flooding in November 2006, which wiped out livestock and washed away crops. In many areas, the intense rains did not offer any long-term relief from the drought because the rain was unable to soak into the dry ground and replenish groundwater, instead washing away the thin layer of topsoil.
Although the humanitarian situation in Somalia has been one of the most desperate in the world, international assistance dwindled
because of the difficulty of working in such a dangerous country and because of numerous failed peace conferences. While TFG officials have met with various warlords and clan elders, they have been reluctant to bring moderate members of the UIC into the government. Pressure from the US and the international community may force the TFG to reconcile with moderate Islamists. But so far, outside intervention has failed to bring a solution to Somalia. While the international community should assist in resolving the conflict and preventing it from destabilizing the entire region, Somalis have to reconcile among themselves.
US involvement
Until the UIC swept to power, the US government had not been deeply involved in Somalia. But in the fight for control of Mogadishu in June 2006, the US covertly backed the warlords who were easily driven out by militias backing the UIC. The US then urgently formed the International Contact Group on Somalia, which included the US, European
nations and Tanzania with the United Nations, the African Union and the Arab League also participating. Curiously, none of the countries or parties most closely tied to the conflict were included. In early January, US Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer, traveled to Africa to discuss the conflict in Somalia. She met numerous diplomats and leaders in Ethiopia, Kenya,
Djibouti and Yemen; but her planned visit to Mogadishu was cancelled due to insecurity.
On the military front, the US almost certainly endorsed Ethiopia’s military intervention, although it is likely that Ethiopia would have acted even without US approval or even against US wishes. The US military mission based in neighboring Djibouti, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), has been involved in a “hearts and minds”
campaign -- building schools and hospitals, drilling wells for drinking water, immunizing
livestock and providing disaster assistance in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. But the US has also trained Ethiopian troops, provided them with
intelligence and used its diplomatic clout to get the international community to support the TFG and Ethiopia’s actions. The US cooperated closely with neighboring countries and its involvement sharply escalated with air attacks on southern Somalia in January 2007. The US claimed to have tracked a “senior al-Qaeda leader” and terrorists involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, although US officials later admitted that the US military failed to kill the terrorists.
Many Somalis resent the US killing civilians in the recent air attacks and potentially further destabilizing Somalia and the entire region in pursuit of a few suspected terrorists. Most Somalis, who just want stability so they can live a normal life, will suffer most if Somalia falls apart again. Should Somalia slip back into a fragmented patchwork of warlords ruling over their fiefdoms, then Somalis, other
Muslims and much of the international community will likely blame Ethiopia and the US, only increasing anti-western and anti-American sentiment. In a video posted on the internet
recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command, said Islamist fighters would "break the back" of Ethiopia, who he claimed the US had sent into Somalia. Somalia could still become a safe haven for terrorists.
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| Villagers collect drinking water and fill their plastic water containers at a well rehabilitated by
Action contre la Faim. The well is located near Caalemo, a small village about 11 miles (18 km) north of Wajid. In Somalia, as is often the case in many developing countries, women are usually responsible for the difficult task of collecting drinking water.
(Photo © 2005 Ron Martin, Jr.) |
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Somalia Facts and Figures (many figures are
estimates):
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Area: 246,200 miles2 (637,658 km2), slightly smaller than Texas.
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Location: northeast coast of Africa on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
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Population (2005 UN estimate): 10.7 million
60% nomadic or semi-nomadic, 25% settled farmers, 15% urban (approximate)
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Literacy (US Department of State): 37.8% (male 49.7%, female 25.8%)
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Life expectancy (US Department of State): 48.7 yrs
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Independence: July 1, 1960 (former colonial powers: Britain and Italy)
1991 Somaliland (northwest Somalia) declared independence from Somalia
1998 Puntland (northwest Somalia) declared autonomy from Somalia
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Ethnic Somalis live in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti
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| Editor's Notes: Guest author Ron Martin, Jr., was the Water and Sanitation Program Manager for the humanitarian nongovernmental organization
Action contre la Faim (the French section of Action Against Hunger) in Somalia from December 2004 through June 2005 and was based in Wajid (Somalia) and Nairobi (Kenya). He managed water source rehabilitations and
hygiene promotion in the Wajid area and cholera prevention in Mogadishu, while coordinating with numerous agencies and partners in Nairobi. He has worked in and traveled extensively through war-torn and
post-conflict settings throughout the world. Martin has a Ph.D. in Environmental Engineering from Michigan Technological University.
He is currently an organic hydroponic farmer in the Columbia River Gorge (Hood River, Oregon) where he windsurfs and skis.
Martin previously contributed articles to Keweenaw Now concerning
Afghanistan. Visit his
contributor page.
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